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Relativism	in	the	philosophy	of	anthropology	
	
Inkeri	Koskinen	
	
Abstract	This	chapter	explores	arguments,	ideas	and	practices	related	to	
relativism	in	social	and	cultural	anthropology.	It	covers	discussions	about	cultural	
relativism,	methodological	relativism,	conceptual	relativism,	relativism	about	
rationality,	moral	relativism,	epistemic	relativism,	and	ontological	relativism.	
	
1.	Introduction	
	
An	article	on	relativism	in	the	philosophy	of	anthropology	should	cover	two	quite	
different	perspectives	on	its	topic.	On	the	one	hand,	it	must	deal	with	arguments	
presented	by	philosophers,	and	on	the	other,	with	ideas	and	practices	developed	by	
anthropologists.	Sometimes	the	two	perspectives	complement	each	other.	Both	
anthropologists	and	philosophers	have	taken	part	in	some	of	the	same	debates	
about	relativism;	philosophers'	arguments	have	influenced	anthropological	theory	
and	ethnographic	research	practices;	and	ideas	developed	in	anthropology	have	
inspired	philosophical	discussions.	On	other	occasions,	however,	there	has	been	
little	communication	across	disciplinary	boundaries,	and	sometimes	the	
communication	has	been	ridden	with	misinterpretations.	
	
I	will	mostly	focus	on	arguments	presented	in	the	tradition	of	analytic	philosophy,	
and	on	ideas	and	practices	developed	in	social	and	cultural	anthropology.	For	the	
past	few	decades,	however,	connections	between	anthropological	theory	and	
philosophy	have	largely	happened	through	continental	thinkers.	I	will	explore	the	
rather	fragmented	interactions	between	the	mainstream	of	professional	philosophy	
and	this	literature.	Within	these	limits,	this	chapter	covers	roughly	a	century's	worth	
of	discussions	and	debates.	
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2.	Relativism	in	anthropology	
	
Popular	conceptions	of	anthropology	often	take	cultural	relativism	to	be	its	sine	qua	
non.	But	though	it	is	still	a	necessary	part	of	any	undergraduate	anthropology	
curriculum,	in	the	writings	of	contemporary	anthropologists	it	is	hard	to	find	the	
thoroughgoing	cultural	relativism	endorsed	in	the	American	cultural	anthropology	in	
the	1940s	and	50s.		
	
Cultural	relativism	became	an	important	idea	in	anthropology	in	a	specific	social	and	
intellectual	context.	It	was	developed	as	an	important	part	of	the	criticism	directed	
against	the	evolutionary	views	of	nineteenth-century	anthropologists	such	as	James	
Frazer	and	Edward	Tylor.	Franz	Boas	and	his	students,	following	similar	ideas	
presented	in	Europe,	rejected	as	ethnocentric	and	racist	the	way	in	which	the	
evolutionists	classified	cultures	on	a	scale	ranging	from	primitive	to	modern	
(Westermarck	1932;	Boas	1940;	Benedict	1934;	Herskovits	1955).	According	to	these	
critics,	anthropologists	should	be	wary	of	using	their	own	cultural	norms	when	
evaluating	the	cultures	they	study.	In	other	words,	from	the	well-documented	
relativity	of	e.g.	moral	judgements	and	epistemic	practices,	they	proceeded	to	the	
relativistic	claim	that	anthropologists	could	or	should	not	move	beyond	this	
relativity.	
	
The	multifaceted	and	often	unclear	idea	of	cultural	relativism	was	formulated	most	
radically	in	the	writings	of	Boas'	students,	particularly	Melville	Herskovits,	who	
emphasised	"the	validity	of	every	set	of	norms	for	the	people	whose	lives	are	guided	
by	them"	(Herskovits	1948,	76),	and	formulated	the	most	cited	definition	of	cultural	
relativism:	"Judgements	are	based	on	experience,	and	experience	is	interpreted	by	
each	individual	in	terms	of	his	own	enculturation."	(Herskovits	1955,	15.)	
	
Cultural	relativism	was	met	with	immediate	criticism	(e.g.	Williams	1947;	Kluckhohn	
1955).	The	most	common	worry	was	that	it	would	lead	to	moral	nihilism.	After	
Herskovits,	it	is	hard	to	fine	anyone	who	endorsed	a	full-blown	form	of	it.	For	
instance,	Clifford	Geertz,	in	his	interpretivist	reading	of	cultural	relativism,	defends	it	
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to	a	certain	degree,	but	also	notes	its	shortcomings:	"The	truth	of	the	doctrine	of	
cultural	(or	historical	–	it	is	the	same	thing)	relativism	is	that	we	can	never	
apprehend	another	people's	or	another	period's	imagination	neatly,	as	though	it	
were	our	own.	The	falsity	of	it	is	that	we	can	therefore	never	genuinely	apprehend	it	
at	all."	(Geertz	1983,	44;	see	also	Geertz	1984.)	
	
Cultural	relativism	is	linked	to	several	other,	sometimes	conflicting	forms	of	
relativism.	Moreover,	at	least	one	form	of	relativism	that	rejects	the	idea	of	culture	
has	recently	been	defended	in	the	anthropological	literature.	
	
Let	us	loosely	characterise	relativism	as	the	claim	that	the	propositions	of	a	certain	
domain	(such	as	knowledge,	ethics,	or	rationality)	are	true	or	false	only	relative	to	an	
underlying	set	of	standards,	of	which	there	can	be	several.	Moreover,	such	sets	of	
standards	must	not	be	ranked,	and	one	cannot	choose	between	different	sets	on	the	
basis	of	a	neutral	rational	comparison	(Kusch	2016).	The	often-noted	ambiguity	of	
cultural	relativism	stems	from	its	definition	only	mentioning	the	framework	
encompassing	a	set	of	standards:	culture.	It	is	not	clear	what	domains	exactly	it	is	
supposed	to	cover.	When	also	the	domain	is	named,	cultural	relativism	gets	
disintegrated.	We	can	distinguish	several	forms	of	relativism	where	culture	is	often	
named	as	the	overarching	framework	to	which	propositions	of	some	domain	are	
relative.		
	
Here	I	will	focus	on	the	following	forms	of	relativism:	1)	Conceptual	relativism,	
according	to	which	conceptual	frameworks	are	or	can	be	incommensurable,	and	
they	shape	human	thought	so	thoroughly	that	statements	made	in	two	different	
conceptual	frameworks	cannot	be	meaningfully	compared.	2)	Relativism	about	
rationality,	according	to	which	judgements	of	rationality	are	relative	to	a	framework,	
and	there	is	no	neutral	criterion	of	rationality.	3)	Moral	relativism,	according	to	
which	moral	judgements	are	relative	to	some	framework,	and	there	is	no	neutral	
criterion	for	adjudicating	between	conflicting	moral	judgements	made	in	different	
domains.	4)	Epistemic	relativism,	according	to	which	there	are	several	knowledge	
systems,	and	there	is	no	neutral	criterion	for	adjudicating	between	conflicting	claims	
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made	in	different	systems.	And	finally	5)	ontological	relativism,	according	to	which	
there	are	many	different	ontologies	in	which	different	kinds	of	objects	emerge,	and	
there	is	no	one	privileged	ontology.	As	we	shall	see,	the	proponents	of	this	form	of	
relativism	(if	it	indeed	is	a	form	of	relativism)	usually	reject	the	notion	of	culture,	
thus	breaking	with	cultural	relativism	altogether.	
	
Before	focusing	on	discussions	and	debates	around	these	forms	of	relativism,	it	is	
however	necessary	to	note	that	in	anthropology,	questions	about	relativism	arise	
first	and	foremost	in	the	context	of	ethnographic	practice.	
	
3.	Methodological	relativism	in	ethnography	
	
Even	though	no	single,	well-defined	relativistic	stance	can	be	claimed	to	be	generally	
accepted	in	anthropology,	a	form	of	methodological	relativism	is	very	common.	
Ethnographers	generally	avoid	the	appraisal	of	their	informants'	knowledge	claims	
and	moral	views.	Even	a	harsh	critic	of	cultural	relativism	such	as	Ian	Jarvie	agrees	
that	if	cultural	relativism	is	interpreted	purely	as	a	methodological	approach,	a	
crucial	factor	of	which	is	the	suspension	of	judgement	and	censure,	it	"is	co-terminus	
with	good	anthropology"	(Jarvie	2006,	582).		
	
Many	misunderstandings	between	philosophers	and	anthropologists	originate	from	
different	approaches	to	questions	about	relativism.	Philosophers	are	typically	
interested	justifying	philosophical	stances.	But	in	modern	anthropology	questions	
about	relativism	surfaced	for	practical	and	methodological	reasons.	With	the	
rejection	of	evolutionary	hierarchies,	anthropologists	had	to	accommodate	the	anti-
racist	conviction	that	there	was	but	a	single	humanity,	with	the	radical	diversity	
evident	for	any	ethnographer	(Boas	1940;	Haines	2007;	Theunissen	2017).	And	
methodological	relativism	offers	a	solution	to	a	number	of	issues	that	arise	in	
ethnographic	practice:	one	must	avoid	ethnocentric	bias,	show	respect	to	the	
informants,	and	refrain	from	hasty	interpretations,	as	they	could	lead	to	
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misunderstandings.	It	is	a	practice	rather	than	a	stance,	a	way	to	encounter	the	
observed	radical	differences	without	diminishing	them.	
	
The	suspension	of	judgement	is,	however,	limited	in	scope.	Anthropologists	typically	
treat	the	views	of	their	colleagues	very	differently	from	those	of	their	informants:	
colleagues	do	face	criticism.	Talal	Asad	has	expressed	this	practical	difference	aptly	
when	reflecting	on	a	disagreement	with	Ernst	Gellner:	"In	taking	up	a	critical	stance	
toward	his	text	I	am	contesting	what	he	says,	not	translating	it,	and	the	radical	
difference	between	these	two	activities	is	precisely	what	I	insist	on."	(Asad	1986,	
156.)		
	
4.	Conceptual	relativism	and	cultural	translation	
	
Foreign	people	and	their	exotic	mores	have	throughout	the	times	inspired	relativistic	
musings,	and	for	the	past	century,	fictional	anthropologists	and	linguists	attempting	
to	understand	alien	cultures	and	languages	have	often	appeared	in	philosophical	
thought	experiments.	One	of	the	best-known	ones	was	presented	by	Willard	Van	
Orman	Quine	in	1960.	He	describes	a	linguist	who	attempts	to	understand	the	
language	of	a	hitherto	not	contacted	people,	and	calls	the	task	that	of	radical	
translation.	The	example	of	the	linguist	in	an	unlikely	situation	is	used	to	make	a	
philosophical	point	about	the	indeterminacy	of	translation:	the	linguist	can	never	be	
sure	of	having	correctly	translated	the	utterances	of	the	people	he	studies,	as	many	
incompatible	conceptual	schemes	can	account	for	their	verbal	behaviour.	As	Quine	
(1960)	notes,	the	doctrine	of	indeterminacy	of	translation	will	sound	familiar	to	
readers	acquainted	with	Ludwig	Wittgenstein’s	remarks	on	meaning.	Wittgenstein	
argued	that	meaning	cannot	be	private;	that	it	is	constituted	by	the	public	use	of	
words;	and	that	we	cannot	understand	individual	sentences	of	a	language	without	
understanding	the	language	as	a	whole	(Wittgenstein	1953;	1958).	
	
The	idea	of	languages	where	each	sentence	has	meaning	only	as	a	part	of	a	whole	
framework,	together	with	the	idea	that	we	have	no	way	of	assessing	whether	we	
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have	succeeded	in	translating	between	two	languages,	can	be	interpreted	in	a	way	
that	leads	to	conceptual	relativism.	A	linguistic	and	cultural	variant	of	such	relativism	
would	claim	that	conceptual	frameworks	are	tied	to	natural	languages,	that	natural	
languages	are	integral	parts	of	human	cultures,	and	that	statements	made	in	two	
different	cultures	cannot	be	meaningfully	compared.	And	a	form	of	relativism	
following	similar	lines,	though	emphasising	also	a	link	between	language	and	world	
view,	had	already	been	developed	in	anthropology	and	linguistics.	It	is	often	ascribed	
to	Boas's	student	Edward	Sapir	(1929),	and	his	student	Benjamin	Whorf	(1956;	see	
also	Hoijer	1954),	and	referred	to	as	the	Sapir-Whorf	Hypothesis,	even	though	they	
never	formulated	any	thesis	together.	Sapir	stressed	the	differences	between	
different	languages	and	argued	that	language	influences	human	thought.	Whorf	
continued	by	suggesting	that	the	differences	between	different	languages	lead	to	
drastically	different	ways	of	thinking	and	perceiving:	"the	world	is	presented	in	a	
kaleidoscopic	flux	of	impressions	which	has	to	be	organized	by	our	minds—and	this	
means	largely	by	the	linguistic	systems	in	our	minds"	(Whorf	1956,	213).			
	
Later,	philosophical	ideas	about	conceptual	schemes	and	translation	became	
influential	in	interpretative	anthropology	where	ethnography	was	often	understood	
as	cultural	translation.	Ethnographers	of	course	could	not	accept	a	total	lack	of	
translatability	between	different	cultures.	However,	as	Geertz	(1973;	see	also	Risjord	
2007)	realised,	combined	with	hermeneutical	views	of	understanding,	
Wittgensteinian	ideas	could	be	used	to	justify	established	ethnographic	practices.	
And	thus	Geertz	stressed	that	culture	is	public	and	observable,	not	private.	And	even	
if	the	ethnographer's	language	differs	from	the	language	used	in	the	culture	the	
ethnographer	studies,	the	former	language	could	be	expanded	in	a	way	that	made	it	
possible	to	translate	expressions	that	originally	gained	their	meaning	in	the	latter.	
	
Also	philosophers	have	repeatedly	rejected	strong	forms	of	conceptual	relativism.	
The	best-known	argument	against	conceptual	relativism	was	presented	by	Donald	
Davidson	(1974).	He	claimed	that	the	idea	of	alternative,	incommensurable	
conceptual	schemes	is	untenable:	for	the	schemes	to	be	truly	incommensurable,	we	
must	fail	to	translate	between	them.	But	if	translation	fails,	we	have	no	reason	to	
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claim	that	what	we	are	attempting	to	translate	is	in	fact	a	language,	not	just	random	
noise.	It	follows	that	to	identify	something	as	language,	we	have	to	be	able	to	
translate	it.	Davidson	further	argues	that	if	we	are	faced	with	the	task	of	radical	
translation,	we	have	no	other	option	than	to	adopt	the	principle	of	charity:	we	must	
assume	that	the	speakers	whose	words	we	attempt	to	translate	are	rational	and	
share	some	beliefs	with	us.	This	is	because	we	cannot	assign	meanings	to	utterances	
without	knowing	the	speakers	beliefs,	nor	can	we	learn	the	beliefs	without	
understanding	what	the	utterances	mean.	According	to	Davidson,	the	only	way	out	
of	the	impasse	is	to	assume	a	common	rationality	and	some	shared	beliefs.	
(Davidson	1974;	see	also	Henderson	1987;	Risjord	2000.)	
	
5.	Rationality	and	relativism	
	
The	so-called	“rationality	and	relativism	debates”	were	sparked	by	Wittgensteinian	
ideas	about	language	and	rationality,	and	especially	by	Peter	Winch's	famous	article	
"Understanding	a	Primitive	Society"	(1964;	see	also	Winch	1958).	Both	Wittgenstein	
and	Winch	maintained	that	we	must	question	not	only	the	applicability	of	our	
familiar	concepts,	but	also	our	norms	of	rationality,	when	evaluating	alien	cultures.	
Wittgenstein	(1967)	found	fault	with	James	Frazer	for	treating	religious	practices	as	
mistakes,	whereas	Winch	turned	his	critical	eye	towards	Evans-Pritchard’s	(1937)	
famous	ethnography	of	the	South-Sudanese	Azande.		
	
Winch	pays	particular	attention	to	a	set	of	Zande	beliefs	that	Evans-Prichard	claimed	
were	formally	inconsistent.	The	clearest	case	of	apparent	irrationality	he	describes	is	
related	to	Zande	witchcraft.	The	Azande	held	that	one	can	identify	a	witch	through	
the	use	of	a	poison	oracle,	and	that	the	substance	that	causes	withcraft	is	inherited	
from	fathers	to	sons	and	from	mothers	to	daughters.	In	other	words,	a	positive	
result	from	the	poison	oracle	would	implicate	a	whole	paternal	or	maternal	line	of	
descent.	And	if	the	number	of	positive	results	were	high	enough,	they	should	prove	
that	all	living	Azande	were	witches.	But	according	to	Evans-Prichard	(1937,	24)	
"Azande	see	the	sense	of	the	argument	but	they	do	not	accept	its	conclusions".	
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Winch	argued	that	it	is	wrong	to	assume	that	the	Azande	were	doing	something	
comparable	to	scientific	explanation	and	confirmation	of	hypotheses:	"Oracular	
revelations	are	not	treated	as	hypotheses	and,	since	their	sense	derives	from	the	
way	they	are	treated	in	their	context,	they	therefore	are	not	hypotheses"	(Winch	
1964,	312).	The	apparent	irrationality	of	the	Zande	beliefs	is	a	result	of	Evans-
Prichard	using	our	familiar	standards	of	rationality	when	assessing	Zande	thought.	
(Winch	1964;	see	also	Winch	1958.)	
	
Winch's	views	provoked	objections,	leading	to	a	lengthy	controversy.	Its	key	papers	
have	been	published	in	two	collections	(Wilson	1970;	Hollis	and	Lukes	1982).	The	
debate	was	understood	to	be	between	two	positions:	relativism	versus	a	position	
that	treats	rationality	as	universal.	Philosophers,	anthropologists	and	sociologists	
agreed	that	there	is	something	of	a	shared	core	rationality;	though	there	was	no	
agreement	on	the	nature	and	core	features	of	such	rationality.	The	debate	remained	
closely	connected	to	philosophical	questions	about	translation,	as	the	central	
problem	of	apparent	irrationality	was	thought	to	arise	when	interpretation	fails.	
Some	appealed	to	arguments	in	the	proximity	of	Davidson's	(1974)	“principle	of	
charity”:	if	we	are	to	understand	foreign	cultures,	we	must	attribute	some	shared	
principles	of	rationality	to	them.	
	
Some	anthropologists,	particularly	cognitive	anthropologists	(e.g.	Sperber	1982),	
took	part	in	the	debate,	arguing	against	Winch's	views.	But	many	of	the	philosophers	
engaged	in	the	debate	mainly	used	the	threat	of	relativism	as	a	foil	in	their	defences	
of	different	conceptions	of	rationality,	which	may	not	have	been	conducive	to	much	
engagement	with	anthropology.	And	the	anthropological	reaction	to	the	whole	
controversy	was	at	times	fairly	critical	towards	all	parties.	This	was	because	many	
anthropologists	found	the	philosophers'	general	disregard	for	empirical	facts	
disconcerting.	For	instance,	according	to	Ernest	Gellner	(1968)	Evans-Pritchard	liked	
toonce	pointed	out	that	both	Winch	and	Winch’s	critic,	Alasdair	MacIntyre,	wrongly	
referred	to	cattle	in	Azande	culture.	The	Azande	do	not	have	cattle.		
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6.	Moral	relativism	and	human	rights	
	
In	anthropology	discussions	about	cultural	relativism	have	focused	much	more	on	
moral	issues.	The	debate	about	cultural	relativism	understood	as	moral	relativism	
started	in	194	when	the	American	Anthropological	Association	published	a	critical	
statement	on	the	UN’s	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights.	The	statement's	main	
author	was	Herskovits.	Some	of	the	key	points	of	the	criticism	were	that	as	the	
declaration	privileged	individual	rights;	that	it	ended	up	disregarding	colonial	cultural	
oppression;	and	that	respect	for	cultural	differences	demanded	the	acceptance	of	
different	moral	codes:	"Standards	and	values	are	relative	to	the	culture	from	which	
they	derive	so	that	any	attempt	to	formulate	postulates	that	grow	out	of	the	beliefs	
or	moral	codes	of	one	culture	must	to	that	extent	detract	from	the	applicability	of	
any	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	to	mankind	as	a	whole."	(AAA	1947,	542.)	
	
The	anthropological	community's	reaction	to	the	association's	statement	has	often	
been	described	as	embarrassment.	The	reason	for	embarrassment,	however,	has	
undergone	changes	over	the	years.	In	their	initial	comments	H.G.	Barnett	(1948)	and	
Julian	H.	Steward	(1948)	did	question	the	moral	viability	of	the	statement's	
overarching	tolerance,	but	were	more	concerned	with	its	lack	of	scientific	rigor.	
Steward	(1948,	351)	concluded	that	"the	Statement	is	a	value	judgment	any	way	it	is	
taken",	and	thus	jeopardised	the	association's	reputation	as	a	scientific	organisation.	
Later,	especially	when	some	human-rights	violators	had	invoked	the	kind	of	moral	
relativism	the	statement	endorsed,	the	focus	shifted	to	worries	about	moral	nihilism	
(Geertz	1984;	Engle	2001).	
		
Compared	with	the	original	declaration,	the	current	human-rights	discourse	is	less	
dominated	by	Western	legal	thought,	and	worries	about	cultural	rights	resembling	
some	of	the	ones	expressed	in	the	1947	statement	have	been	brought	up	by	thinkers	
from	developing	countries,	as	well	as	by	representatives	of	indigenous	peoples.	Over	
the	years	many	anthropologists	have	lamented	that	the	1947	statement	prevented	
anthropological	involvement	in	discussions	about	human	rights.	Many	attempts	have	
been	made	to	formulate	positions	that	would	make	anthropological	viewpoints	
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taken	more	into	account	in	the	human-rights	discourse.	Finally	in	1999,	the	AAA	
adopted	a	declaration	on	anthropology	and	human	rights,	which	the	association's	
Human	Rights	Committee	has	called	a	“complete	turnaround”	from	the	stance	taken	
in	the	1947	statement	(AAA	1999;	Engle	2001;	Goodale	2006;	Brown	2008).	
	
7.	Epistemic	relativism	in	the	postcolonial	critique	of	anthropology	
	
Postcolonial	theory	is	often	ambivalent	in	its	treatment	of	relativism.	From	the	
literature	it	is	easy	to	find	both	statements	that	sound	fiercely	relativistic,	and	
statements	that	are	resolutely	antirelativist.	These	latter	positions	have	often	been	
overlooked	by	the	critics	of	overtly	political	or	"postmodern"	theorizing.	For	instance	
Paul	Boghossian	claims	that	in	many	fields	in	the	humanities	and	the	social	sciences	
it	is	by	now	orthodoxy	to	claim	that	there	are	"many	radically	different,	yet	‘equally	
valid’	ways	of	knowing	the	world,	with	science	being	just	one	of	them"	(Boghossian	
2006a,	2).	Some	of	his	examples	point	towards	postcolonial	theory,	and	indeed,	
notions	such	as	"alternative	epistemologies"	and	"different	ways	of	knowing"	
abound	in	postcolonial	literature.	They	are	sometimes	interpreted	as	expressions	of	
postmodern	epistemic	relativism	(mainly	called	so	by	its	critics).	This	Nietzschean	
and	Foucauldian	form	of	relativism	takes	knowledge	to	be	always	perspectival,	
partial	and	tied	to	power	structures:	it	is	the	dominant	social	group	or	culture	that	
gets	to	set	its	own	criteria	for	assessing	knowledge	claims	as	universally	valid	
(Baghramian	2004,	79–88;	Foucault	1977/1980).	
Postcolonialism	is	overtly	political.	Already	in	early	key	works	(Fanon	1952;	Deloria	
1969;	Said	1978),	a	part	of	the	political	criticism	was	directed	towards	Western	
science,	and	particularly	anthropology,	which	was	claimed	to	have	served	colonial	
rule.	But	while	science	is	criticised,	the	focus	in	the	multifaceted	postcolonial	
literature	is	usually	on	social	injustices	colouring	every	aspect	of	the	lives	of	the	
oppressed,	the	demand	for	liberation,	and	the	development	of	new,	more	socially	
just	research	methods.	Not	on	the	formulation	or	defence	of	some	relativistic	
stance.	And	indeed,	rather	than	on	relativism,	the	countercriticism	in	anthropology	
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has	focused	on	cultural	essentialism	and	the	reintroduction	of	the	romantic	notion	
of	"the	native"	(Kuper	2003;	McGhee	2008).		
	
In	fact,	the	political	aims	of	postcolonial	theory	can	lead	to	antirelativism.	Influenced	
by	critical	theory	and	feminist	philosophy,	some	postcolonial	thinkers	embrace	
Marxist	forms	of	universalism,	and	some	reject	epistemic	relativism	in	a	way	that	
echoes	arguments	presented	in	standpoint	theory	(see	Figueroa	and	Harding	2003;	
Harding	2011).	For	instance,	Boaventura	de	Sousa	Santos	argues	in	his	influential	
book	Epistemologies	of	the	South	that	“epistemicide”	is	an	integral	part	of	
systematic	colonial	oppression.	According	to	him,	scientific	knowledge	is	limited	in	
ways	that	prevent	it	from	grasping	"the	inexhaustible	diversity	of	the	world"	(Santos	
2014,	108).	He	argues	that	different	epistemologies,	particularly	ones	endorsed	in	
the	emancipatory	movements	of	the	"global	South,"	should	complement	scientific	
knowledge.	But	he	rejects	epistemic	relativism	as	an	unsuitable	position	for	anyone	
striving	for	social	emancipation:	"If	all	the	different	kinds	of	knowledge	are	equally	
valid	as	knowledge,	every	project	of	social	transformation	is	equally	valid	or,	
likewise,	equally	invalid."	(Santos	2014,	190.)		
	
So	the	claim	that	there	are	multiple	epistemologies	or	knowledge	systems	can	be	
interpreted	as	pluralistic	rather	than	relativistic	(see	Chang,	this	volume).	However,	
such	postcolonial	pluralism	does	not	always	extend	to	science.	As	Arun	Agrawal	
(1995)	has	noted,	mistrust	in	science	has	led	many	postcolonial	critics	to	treat	
science	as	a	single,	coherent	knowledge	system,	opposed	by	the	multitude	of	
oppressed	knowledge	systems.	Nevertheless,	the	aim	of	many	postcolonial	scholars	
is	to	integrate	science	more	closely	with	Southern,	indigenous	etc.	knowledge	
systems,	and	to	develop	decolonised	research	methods.	Still,	power	asymmetries	are	
often	taken	to	impede	such	integration,	as	the	marginalised	knowledge	systems	can	
easily	get	either	misrepresented,	or	as	in	e.g.	ethnomedicine,	commercially	
exploited.	(Smith	1999;	Denzin	et.	al	2008;	Ludwig	2016.)	
	
The	postcolonial	critique	of	science	and	the	development	of	postcolonial	
methodology	have	engendered	new	forms	of	research,	such	as	indigenous	activist	
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research.	In	anthropology,	they	have	altered	ethnographic	research	practices.	Co-
research	and	participatory	projects,	where	anthropologists	collaborate	with	
representatives	of	the	people	they	study,	have	become	more	common.	As	I	have	
argued	elsewhere	(Koskinen	2014),	these	developments	challenge	methodological	
relativism	in	anthropology.	When	informants	become	co-researchers	in	participatory	
projects,	suspension	of	judgement	is	no	longer	an	either	epistemically	or	ethically	
viable	attitude	towards	their	views.	
	
8.	Ontological	relativism	and	anthropology	without	culture	
	
The	central	role	that	the	concept	of	culture	has	long	held	in	anthropology	has	been	
questioned	in	many	ways	during	the	past	fifty	years.	The	influences	of	Marxism	and	
postcolonialism,	and	in	1986	the	publication	of	Writing	Culture	(Clifford	&	Marcus	
1986),	a	seminal	collection	of	essays	addressing	the	rhetorical	techniques	
ethnographers	use	to	establish	their	epistemic	authority,	added	to	an	already	
existing	uneasiness.	Ethnographies	depicted	unified	cultures,	thus	hiding	conflicts	
from	view.	Moreover,	as	Roy	Wagner	(1975)	had	noted,	if	concepts	gained	their	
meaning	in	their	cultural	contexts,	then	surely	this	applied	also	to	the	concept	of	
culture.	And	indeed,	for	instance	Marily	Strathern	(1980)	has	claimed	that	the	Hagen	
no	not	have	anything	resembling	our	distinction	between	the	invariant	nature	on	the	
one	hand	and	culture	as	human	elaboration	upon	it	on	the	other.	Ethnographers	had	
to	consider	the	possibility	that	the	concept	of	culture	might	not	be	in	any	meaningful	
way	applicable	to	the	people	they	study,	and	that	using	it	might	be	misleading	
(Kuper	1999;	Risjord	2007).		
	
The	recent	“ontological	turn”	in	anthropology	has	added	new	arguments	to	the	
arsenal	of	the	anthropologists	who	wish	to	do	away	with	the	concept	of	culture.	Not	
only	do	the	ontological	anthropologists	prefer	to	use	local	concepts	instead	of	
overarching	ones	–	such	as	culture	–	but	they	have	questioned	the	whole	
representationalist	idea	embedded	in	the	notion	of	culture.	According	to	these	
critics,	both	cognitive	and	interpretative	anthropological	theories	agree	that	there	is	
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one	world,	which	different	cultures	represent	in	diverse	ways.	This	dualist	position	is	
what	the	ontological	turn	rejects.	Anthropology	is	not	translation	between	
worldviews	or	cultures	(Henare,	Holbraad	&	Wastell	2007;	Sivado	2015;	Holbraad	&	
Pedersen	2017;	Heywood	2017).	
		
In	practice,	the	aim	is	"to	take	things	encountered	in	the	field	as	they	present	
themselves,	rather	than	immediately	assuming	that	they	signify,	represent,	or	stand	
for	something	else"	(Henare,	Holbraad	and	Wastell	2007,	2).	And	instead	of	focusing	
on	speech	and	human	interactions,	ontological	anthropology	pays	attention	to	the	
different	objects	that	emerge	in	different	human-nonhuman	interactions.	Many	of	
its	proponents	reject	the	idea	of	matter	and	ideas	as	distinct	categories,	often	citing	
Gilles	Deleuze's	and	Bruno	Latour's	ideas.	This	leads	to	talk	about	plural	ontologies.	
	
It	is	not	entirely	clear	whether	the	ontological	turn	entails	ontological	relativism.	As	
Martin	Paleček	and	Mark	Risjord	(2012)	note,	ontological	anthropologists	hold	that	
different	objects	emerge	in	different	networks	of	interaction,	and	no	ontology	is	
privileged	over	others.	However,	the	view	can	also	be	interpreted	as	perspectivism,	
or	as	David	Ludwig	(2018)	has	argued,	pluralism.	But	if	it	is	interpreted	as	a	form	of	
relativism,	then	from	a	philosophical	point	of	view	it	is	an	interesting	one.	Paleček	
and	Risjord	claim	that	it	is	immune	to	the	Davidsonian	critique,	which	rests	largely	
on	the	principle	of	charity	and	the	identification	of	incommensurability	with	a	failure	
of	translation.	The	ontological	anthropologists	explicitly	reject	the	idea	of	
anthropology	as	translation,	as	well	any	representationalist	distinction	between	
scheme	and	content.	So	if	the	view	is	interpreted	as	a	form	of	relativism,	it	could	
spur	new	philosophical	debates	about	relativism	in	anthropology.	
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